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society’s vicarious beliefs about its past. We show that incorrect social memory is a key
ingredient in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts.
We analyze an infinite-horizon model in which two countries face off each period in
a game of conflict characterized by the possibility of mutually destructive “all out war”
that yields catastrophic consequences for both sides. Each country is inhabited by a
dynastic sequence of individuals. Each individual cares about future individuals in the
same country, and can communicate with the next generation of their countrymen using
private messages. Social memory is based on these messages, and on physical evidence
— a sequence of imperfectly informative public signals of past behavior. We find that
if the future is sufficiently important for all individuals, then regardless of the precision
of physical evidence from the past there is an equilibrium in which the two countries
engage in all out war with arbitrarily high frequency, an outcome that cannot arise in
the standard repeated game. In our construction, each new generation “repeats the
mistakes” of its predecessors, leading to an endless cycle of destructive behavior.
Surprisingly, we find that degrading the quality of information that individuals have
about current decisions may “improve” social memory. This in turn ensures that arbi-
trarily frequent all out wars cannot occur.
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1. Introduction
“In 1989, the Serbs commemorated their defeat at the hands of the Turks in the
Battle of Blackbird Field, in 1389, and it formed the starting point for the Balkans
wars of the 1990s.” — Baumeister and Hastings (1997).
The “memories” that induced such a destructive war were obviously not direct. Instead,
they were shaped by oral or written accounts of history that were passed on through the
generations. This paper develops a model in which destructive behavior can arise from this
type of indirect memory, which social scientists in various fields refer to as social memory.
One commonly accepted definition, given by Crumley (2002), describes social memory as
“the means by which information is transmitted among individuals and groups and from one
generation to another. Not necessarily aware that they are doing so, individuals pass on their
behaviors and attitudes to others in various contexts but especially through emotional and
practical ties and in relationships among generations [...]”
The definition is obviously neutral about how social memory is used.1 This paper develops
a model that shows how social memory, specifically incorrect social memory in the face of
contrary physical evidence, is instrumental in creating and perpetuating destructive conflict.
Clearly, not all conflicts are universally destructive. Some yield clear winners and losers.
Indeed, there is a long history of strategic models of war and conflict in this vein dating back
at least to Schelling (1960). Some recent models, for instance Schwarz and Sonin (2007),
Jackson and Morelli (2008), Chassang and i Miguel (2008), and Yared (2009), are rooted in
the theory of repeated and/or dynamic games. Others such as Fearon (1995) and Glaeser
(2005) place conflict in a signalling context.2 A typical characteristic of the literature is that
there may be positive incentives for conflict in some states of the world by at least one social
stratum that stands to gain from what is an overall destructive conflict with another group
or society.
Our interest in this paper, however, is in conflicts that are known to have no winners at all;
conflicts that are so destructive that existing theories have trouble explaining them. Hence,
1Fields in which social memory is commonly studied include anthropology, psychology, and distributed
cognition. See, for instance, Cattell and Climo (2002), Connerton (1989), Crumley (2002), Fentress and
Wickham (1992), Pennebaker, Paez, and Rime` (1997), Rogers (1997) and Sutton (2005).
2Overall, the literature on war and conflict is immense and impossible to do justice here. However, see
Yared (2009) for an excellent bibliography. In Section 5 we discuss those models of conflict that, like ours,
have some element of intergenerational memory or communication.
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standard repeated games are less useful for our purposes since they only sustain “moderately
bad” outcomes, i.e., outcomes above the stage game minmax payoff. In this sense, repeated
game models of war afford each participant a modicum of self protection. Similarly, signalling
games are limited in that they require agents to assign large likelihood to objective states of
the world in which the conflict is desirable from at least one country’s point of view. Yet in
some conflicts, World War I being a case in point, decision makers are often aware at the
outset that the hostilities are extremely undesirable for all concerned. Foley (2005) makes
this argument plainly.
Rather than dismissing these models, the present paper attempts to expand them in a
way that can accommodate a role for social memory in conflicts. We therefore posit a model
that abstracts away from scenarios in which there are positive incentives for conflict.
Consider a game faced by two nations each period in which all out conflict is catastrophi-
cally bad for all involved in a way that everyone understands. For concreteness, we call these
nations F (France) and G (Germany). These countries are engaged in a repeated Game of
Conflict. In a Game of Conflict, there are three types of “peaceful” profiles, and one ex-
ceedingly “destructive” action profile. The peace profiles come in three varieties. One that
is good for both sides (“cooperation”), one that is bad for one side and good for the other
(“domination” by one country over the other), and a third one in which domination by one
side over the other is reversed. The “destructive” action profile takes both countries below
their “individually rational” (minmax) payoff levels in the stage game. We refer to this profile
as “all out war.” Our main result demonstrates the existence of an equilibrium in which all
out war occurs with arbitrarily high frequency.
Clearly, if these countries are thought of as unitary actors with perfect memory, then
the aforementioned equilibrium could not occur since it would take each nation’s long run
payoff below its stage minmax. Instead, we formulate a generational model based loosely on
Crumley’s notion of social memory. Specifically, each nation in this conflict is a “dynasty,”
i.e., a placeholder for a sequence of individual decision makers, each of whom is finitely lived
but cares about what happens to future generations who inhabit the same nation-dynasty.
Families, tribes, and ethnic groups are all ongoing entities with similar features. We initially
focus attention on a canonical case of one-period lived individuals, however we later extend
the results to any demographic structure in which individual lifetimes are uniformly bounded.
At the end of each period, each “stand-in” decision maker observes the realized action
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profile, then chooses what and how much of his information to pass on to his successor in
the dynasty by way of a private message. Each new entrant has no direct memory of the
past, but nevertheless forms a belief about it from two possible sources. One is the message
about the past — the written or oral historiography of the dynasty — received from his
predecessor. The other source is the physical evidence — history’s “footprint” — in the
form of an informative but imperfect public signal of past events. Social memory is therefore
created over time by a combination of evidence and intergenerational communication within
dynastic nations.
Our main result demonstrates that if each individual decision maker is sufficiently con-
cerned about the future, then there exists a sequential equilibrium in the dynastic Game of
Conflict with the following properties. (1) All out war occurs with arbitrarily high frequency.
(2) Physical evidence is ignored - i.e., neither beliefs nor actions condition on evidence from
the past. (3) Social memory following counterfactual histories may be incorrect.
The equilibrium roughly works as follows. On path, behavior cycles deterministically be-
tween long periods of war and (relatively) short periods of peace.3 Along this path, each side’s
long run payoff is below its stage minmax. This means that even though a self-protective
action is available to each nation during the war epoch, it is not chosen. Instead, the equi-
librium prescribes that the all out war profile is chosen. In order to rationalize this choice,
each decision maker believes that peace-time will be a lot worse for his country if he fails to
wage war today.
To understand how such beliefs can occur, consider a deviation by, say F , in which F
fails to wage war during the war epoch. In that case the equilibrium prescribes a punishment
continuation in which, during the peaceful period, the nations shift from a cooperative peace
to a hegemonic one in which G dominates F . This asymmetric peace continues for a short
time until the next war epoch, at which point a long phase of all out war resumes.
But why should F follow this prescription when the self-protective (minmax) action is
available? It is at this point where the possibility of incorrect social memory is critical.
Recall that the asymmetric peace is off-path, i.e., it occurs only after an initial deviation by
a decision maker in F . Furthermore, knowledge of the deviation must be communicated to
future decision makers in each country. So, after receiving this out-of-equilibrium message
3Although the equilibrium is deterministic, the logic extends to a “sunspot” equilibrium in which a war
epoch is brought about by some exogenous randomization device.
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from his predecessor, the future entrant in F must weigh two possibilities. On the one hand,
the predecessor’s message may be in error — that is, no such action deviation took place.
On the other, the message is correct. A deviation did occur, indicating an action error by a
predecessor in F . Each of these possibilities has different implications. If the former is an
order of magnitude less likely than the latter, then the current decision maker in F suffers
from the illusion that it will not be dominated in the future peace period. In other words, the
entrant will not anticipate his own dynasty’s punishment. Moreover, F will hold this belief
even if the evidence points to the contrary. In short, while F “forgets” that its dynasty has
deviated, G does not. Moreover, in the equilibria we construct below, even once the leader
of country F realizes his mistake, he is unable to relay this information to F ’s future leaders
who are then doomed to make the same mistake.
A few clarifications may be helpful at this point. First, the equilibrium construction does
not depend on anyone’s failure to understand the consequences of war. Everyone in this
model correctly anticipates that it will be horrific.4 Rather, what matters is the potential
failure of future decision makers to understand the true nature of the error that leads to
an off-path message. Because of this, current decision makers are lead to the inescapable
conclusion on path that war is necessary. This logic and its important consequences do not
hold in standard repeated games with infinitely-lived players.5
Second, the logic is similar to but generally different from a related result that also utilizes
dynastic communication. In Anderlini, Gerardi, and Lagunoff (2008) (AGL), it is shown
that for certain stage games, any (interior) feasible payoff vector of the stage game can be
sustained by a sequential equilibrium in a dynastic game with intra-dynastic communication
if the participants place sufficient weight on future generations’ payoffs. However, critically,
even the least restrictive AGL results apply only to three or more dynasties. By contrast, the
present result covers the important, and perhaps more common, case of bilateral conflict. The
difference is not just superficial: the construction in AGL makes use of the “large numbers” of
participants in a way that cannot be adapted to the current environment.6 More importantly,
4The argument is therefore consistent with arguments often made, for instance, about World War I that
both German and French leaders were aware in advance of the casualties that the Battle of Verdun would
entail - see Foley (2005).
5Nor do they hold in overlapping generations games with full memory (Bhaskar, 1998, Kandori, 1992a,
Salant, 1991, Smith, 1992, among others).
6There are two results in AGL, one requiring three or more players, and another which applies to a larger
class of stage games requiring four or more players. The first result requires three or more so that unilateral
deviations from the equilibrium path can be identified. This is standard in repeated games. The second result
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the role of evidence and the question of whether it plays any role in swaying beliefs of the
participants is not even considered in AGL. The present paper shows that incorrect social
memory can be perpetual, even in the face of contrary physical evidence. The logic relies on
the fact that messages can in principle convey more information than any imperfect physical
evidence. This is because they are sent after the current action profile is observed. It turns
out that this is sufficient to make viable equilibria in which physical evidence is ignored, but
the messages convey the “wrong” information to future individuals.
To underscore this last point, we examine a variation of the main model in which in-
formation is further degraded so that present actions of the rival country are not directly
observed. All dynastic members observe the same imperfect evidence about the rival. We
show that, in any pure strategy equilibrium, messages would be useless in this case, and so
participants would be forced to confront the evidence. The perpetual state of frequent all
out war sketched above cannot arise in this case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first set up the model in Section 2.
In Sections 3 and 4 we present our main results. Section 5 examines related literature. We
compare our work to other potential explanations of destructive conflicts. Finally, Section 6
concludes. For ease of exposition, some technical material has been relegated to an Appendix.
2. The Baseline Model
There are two countries — France (F) and Germany (G) — that face off in an infinitely
repeated game. We first describe the stage game and posit an explicit demographic structure
that defines each nation-dynasty. We then define the strategies, beliefs, and Sequential Equi-
librium of this game. Social memory will be shown to be a well defined notion arising naturally
from a standard (though perhaps under-appreciated) aspect of Sequential Equilibrium.
2.1. A Dynastic Game of Conflict
Though the class of stage games to which our analysis applies is broad, we focus attention
on the following symmetric 3× 3 Game of Conflict. Each country has three feasible actions,
{C,D,W}. Restricting attention momentarily to the actions C and D, the game is a version
of the Prisoners’ dilemma. That is, the payoff, from the point of view of the row player is
pi(D,C) > pi(C,C) > pi(D,D) > pi(C,D). The third action (W ) available to each country is
in AGL requires four or more players (dynasties) in order to identify a deviation from among those n − 1
players who carry out the punishment of one player.
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interpreted as “war.” War is strictly dominated by strategy D for both players: pi(D, · ) >
pi(W, · ). Both countries choosing W is an “all out war.” An all out war is worse for both
players than the outcome (D,D): pi(D,D) > pi(W,W ). The two key properties embedded in
these assumptions are that (1) all out war pushes both sides below their individually rational
(minmax) payoffs; (2) as with the standard Prisoner’s dilemma, mutual cooperation CC is
the unique, symmetric efficient payoff. A numerical example of this game is given in (1)
below.
C D W
C 2, 2 −1, 3 −25, 1
D 3,−1 0, 0 −8,−5
W 1,−25 −5,−8 −10,−10
(1)
Notice that in (1), if F and G were to face off indefinitely and were modeled as standard
long-run players with perfect recall, then “very frequent” all out wars could not take place.
This is because, as all out war occurs more and more frequently, the long-run average payoff
of both countries approaches −10. But both F and G can guarantee a payoff of at least −8
in every period by unilaterally choosing D.
Our results derive from the assumption that each of the two countries F and G identifies a
dynasty. A dynasty is a placeholder for successive generations of individual decision makers.
At any given time, the dynasty is inhabited by one such decision maker who cares about his
own payoff and those of future generations within his own dynasty.
For ease of exposition we first restrict attention to a baseline model in which each indi-
vidual in each dynasty lives one period. This simplifies the notation considerably since each
period t can then be identified with a unique cohort. In Section 6, we discuss an extension
to all games in which there is a uniform upper bound L on the length of life of all individuals
in the model.
The individual decision makers who inhabit F and G in period t are denoted by F t and
Gt respectively. Let at = (atF , atG) denote the action profile in period t, and the two countries’
per-period payoffs by piF(at) and piG(at), respectively.
Individuals care not only about their per-period payoffs, but about the long-run future
payoff of their country as well. Note that since each country is populated by separate in-
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dividuals through time, the degree by which future payoffs are taken into account can be
interpreted as the degree of “altruism” that individuals exhibit towards future individuals in
their own country. This is modeled using standard geometric weights, so that given a stream
of per-period payoffs, the time t continuation payoffs to F t and Gt, including both the present
and the future components can be written as
ΠtF = (1− δ)
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−tpiF(aτ ) and ΠtG = (1− δ)
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−tpiG(aτ ) (2)
In the dynastic game what each individual observes about the past history of play when
he enters the game is critical. If the individuals F t and Gt could only observe the actual
history of action profiles, denoted by ht = (a0, a1, . . . , at−1) ∈ H t, then the model would
be equivalent to the standard repeated game world of, say, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986);7
incorrect social memory would be ruled out by assumption, and no frequent all out wars
could take place. Instead, when an individual (F t or Gt) enters the game, he observes two
things (in no particular order): (i) imperfect publicly available evidence of the past history
of actions and (ii) a private message about the previous history from his predecessor, who
was alive at t− 1 in his own country and whom he replaces.
Regarding (i) the publicly available evidence, its precise form does not matter for the
results, however, for concreteness, it is in the form of a history of imperfect, but informative
signals of the action history. Formally, let st = (p0, p1, . . . , pt−1) denote the evidence observed
by individuals F t and Gt at the beginning of t. At the end of each period t, a signal pt is
conditionally realized given action profile at. Again, the parametric form is not important,
but to fix ideas, let pt = at with probability (1 + 8γ)/9 (there are 9 possible action profiles),
and is equal to any aˆt 6= at with probability (1− γ)/9. Here, γ parameterizes the precision of
st; when γ = 0 the observed evidence st contains no information about the previous history,
and when γ = 1 the observed evidence st equals the true history of action profiles with
probability one.
Note that we take the per-period signals pt to be realized once and for all in each period
t, in the sense that, for instance, all individuals from the end of t = 0 onwards, observe the
same realized signal about what happened in period t = 0. Once this (imprecise) historical
7This is an immediate consequence of the “one-shot deviation principle.” See for instance the textbooks
by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) or Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
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footprint is set, it remains as given through time.
Regarding (ii) the intra-dynastic message, let mti denote the private message received by
the individual in dynasty i = F ,G at the start of period t. To start things off, m0i is the null
message, and for t ≥ 1, message mti is sent by the individual in dynasty i in cohort t − 1 to
his dynastic successor in cohort t. The message space M ti may be, but need not be, the set
of action histories ht.8
The timing within each period is as follows. An individual from dynasty i = F ,G, first
observes the evidence st and his private message mti. He then selects an action a
t
i. Then
observes the action atj, j 6= i selected by the opposing individual at time t and subsequently,
the updated evidence st+1. Once period t is over, the individual sends a private message mt+1i
to his successor in the dynasty.
To summarize, in each period each country is inhabited by a representative one-period
lived decision maker who cares about his own and future countrymen’s payoffs. Upon entry,
an individual observes an imprecise footprint of what took place prior to his entry. He
also observes a private message concerning the past left by his predecessor. While alive, he
observes directly the other country’s decisions and how current action profiles generate a
footprint for the future. Finally, he sends a message to his successor just before his own exit.
2.2. Equilibrium
In every period t, the t-action strategies determine the actions of individuals F t and Gt as
a function of what they have observed at the beginning of the period. Formally, for each
dynasty i = F ,G, the t-action strategy is expressed as αti(mti, st) = ati.9 The individual’s
t-message strategy determines the messages sent to his successor individual at the end of the
period. His t-message strategy is expressed as µti(m
t
i, s
t+1, at) = mt+1i . Taken together, α
t
i
and µti make up the individual’s full t-strategy f
t
i = (α
t
i,µ
t
i). A strategy profile f refers to the
array of all individuals in both countries in all periods.
One can distinguish between beginning-of-period-t beliefs and end-of-period-t beliefs of
individuals F t and Gt. For an individual t in dynasty i, the beginning-of-period belief
8Because our main results are constructive, there is considerable latitude in the possible choices of message
spaces. The ones considered here seem the natural ones in many ways. All our results hold unchanged for
arbitrary “sufficiently rich” message spaces.
9The main results are constructive, utilizing only pure strategies. Consequently, we restrict attention to
pure strategies in the formal definitions.
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bti(m
t
i, s
t) is a probability distribution over the entire set of past action and message his-
tories in H t × (×tτ=0(M τF ×M τG )), given his inherited message mti and evidence st. The
end-of-period belief bti(m
t
i, s
t+1, at) describes conditional probability distribution over the set
of end of period action and message histories in H t+1 × (×t+1τ=0(M τF ×M τG )) given one’s mes-
sage, the evidence, and also the action profile taken in date t. As is standard, a system of
beliefs b refers to an array of beliefs of all individuals in all periods.
We refer to the pair (f ,b) as an equilibrium of the model if and only if it constitutes a Se-
quential Equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) of the dynastic game. Sequential Equilibrium
is generally accepted as one of the (if not the) benchmark equilibrium concepts for dynamic
games of incomplete information. Sequential Equilibrium requires that strategies of all in-
dividuals must be sequentially rational given the equilibrium beliefs. Just as importantly,
it also requires that equilibrium beliefs b must be recoverable as the limit of beliefs entirely
determined by Bayes’ rule using “fully mixed” perturbations of the equilibrium strategies.
This is more than a technical condition. Intuitively, it means that all individuals share a
complete philosophy about how other individuals’ mistakes or trembles rationalize off-path
events. Section 3 below demonstrates how the theory makes critical use of this “shared
philosophy” to generate frequent all out wars.
3. Frequent All Out Wars: A Result
Our first and main result is that it is possible in equilibrium for the two countries F and G
to be caught in a perpetual cycle of frequent all out wars.
Proposition 1. Arbitrarily Frequent All Out Wars: Fix any positive integer N . Then there
exists a pair (f ,b) which: (i) is an equilibrium for any δ sufficiently close to 1 and for any
precision level γ ∈ [0, 1), and (ii) is such that the action profile (W,W ) is played N − 1 times
out of any N consecutive periods.
Proposition 1 asserts that catastrophic conflict resulting in below-minmax long run payoffs
can occur in equilibrium. The argument, given in three basic steps, follows along the lines of
the intuition outlined in the Introduction. The rough idea is that a self-protective (minmax)
action may not be taken by the current decision maker after a prior deviation by his dynasty
if his belief about whether the deviation occurred is incorrect. Our task in the proof is to
construct an equilibrium strategy profile f = (α,µ) in which this is the case. This is done in
Step 1. The external appearance of the equilibrium in Step 1 is standard. Namely, there are
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three phases: an “equilibrium” phase, and a “punishment phase” for each i = F ,G following
a unilateral deviation that came most recently from within dynasty i. However, because the
equilibrium phase results in below-minmax long run payoffs, the individuals’ beliefs following
off-path messages are critical. Step 2 describes these beliefs b and establishes the consistency
property, namely that these beliefs are obtained as the limit from a sequence of completely
mixed trembles on the strategy profile. Finally, Step 3 establishes sequential rationality of
the equilibrium, i.e., deviations are not profitable after any history for δ close to one.
Step 1. Construction of the equilibrium profile f = (α,µ). Fix N as in Proposition 1.
Before proceeding with the formal definition, the action strategy profile α is first described
heuristically in terms of its continuation phases. These are depicted in a schematic way in
Figure 1. The determination of which phase the players are in depends on the messages to be
specified shortly. The “equilibrium” phase consists of an infinite repetition of an N -period
cycle. In each such cycle, the first N − 1 periods are classified as “war periods.” These war
periods are followed by a single “peace period.” The cycle then repeats ad infinitum.10 A
“punishment phase” for i consists of T rounds (with T finite) of a similar type of cycle as in
the equilibrium phase. As in the equilibrium phase, each cycle lasts N periods with the first
N − 1 periods classified as “war periods.” The difference here is that the prescribed behavior
in the “peace period” that follows is different than in the peace periods of the equilibrium
phase. We now describe exactly “who does what” in each phase.
According to Figure 1, in every war period regardless of phase, the profile WW is chosen.
The two countries start off in the equilibrium phase during which the cooperative action
pair CC is chosen in peace periods. They remain in this phase unless a “deviation” (yet
to be described) occurs. If individual F t deviates from the prescriptions of the equilibrium,
then the F-punishment phase starts (or re-starts, as appropriate) at which time the pair CD
(recall that F is the row player) is chosen in the peace periods. Similarly, any deviation by
any individual Gt starts (or re-starts, as appropriate) the G-punishment phase in which DC
is chosen in the peace periods. Double deviations are ignored. Each of these phases, if no
subsequent deviations occur, lasts until the next T peace periods have passed, after which
time the two countries return to the equilibrium phase.
10Since the first period is t = 0, the first peace period is t = N − 1. All periods with t = `N − 1 with ` a
positive integer greater than 1 are also peace periods. All other periods are war periods.
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F Deviates
H
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H
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EquilibriumPhase
F→G→
[
W
W
]
. . .
. . .
[
W
W
][
C
C
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
N Periods
F − Punishment Phase
F→G→
[
W
W
]
. . .
. . .
[
W
W
][
C
D
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
N Periods
G − Punishment Phase
F→G→
[
W
W
]
. . .
. . .
[
W
W
][
D
C
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
N Periods
Figure 1
The formal definitions of action and message strategies are as follows. We start by defining
the message space. For all periods t ≥ TN − 1, the message space is the same for each
dynasty i = F ,G and is given by
Mi = {m∗,mF ,τ ,mG,τ}τ=1,...,T
At the beginning of each period, messages in Mi determine the place in each phase. The
message m∗ is the equilibrium phase message. The message mF ,τ indicates an F -punishment
phase message in which there are τ cycles remaining in the punishment phase. Intuitively,
the index τ = T, T − 1, . . . , 1 is used to “count down” the remaining peace periods that
must pass before the F punishment phase ends.11 A symmetric description applies to mG,τ .
For the first NT − 1 periods these message spaces have superfluous messages because not
enough periods have elapsed since the game started at t = 0. Consequently, one would have
to “shrink” the message spaces for these periods in order to have only meaningful messages.
We omit the details.
11Notice that the messages do not track the place in each cycle, i.e., q periods left in the τth cycle. This is
because calendar time is common knowledge, and the calendar clock can always be used to distinguish war
periods from peace periods. The assumption of common knowledge of calendar time can easily be dropped,
however, an added notational burden to the message space would be then required — one that adds very
little insight to the analysis.
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In all that follows, we define the strategy for F with the understanding that G’s strategy
is completely symmetric. The prescriptions of αF and µF will not vary with the signal s
t in
any way.
The action strategy αF is defined as follows. In all war periods t > 0, and for any message
mtF and signal realization s
t, αtF(m
t
F , s
t) = W . In words, the prescribed action in all war
periods in all phases is the same. Namely, αF prescribes W in every war period, regardless of
the phase. Hence, the only difference between on-path and off-path phases is in the prescribed
peace-time behavior.
Here and throughout the rest, we treat the initial null message m0F as equal to m
∗. Next,
for any peace period t ≥ 0 let
αtF(m
t
F , s
t) =
{
C if mtF = m
∗ or mF ,τ , for any τ
D if mtF = m
G,τ , for any τ
Hence, αF prescribes that in peace periods, the individual chooses C in both the equilibrium
phase and the F -punishment phase. He chooses D in the G-punishment phase.
We now define the message strategy µF for dynasty F as follows. Intuitively, the messages
“truthfully” indicate to the next player how and when to switch between phases. First, let
t > 0 be any war period. Then for any message-signal pair, (mtF , s
t+1),
µtF(m
t
F , s
t+1, at) =

mt+1F = m
t
F if a
t = WW or if bilateral deviation from WW
mF ,T if F t unilaterally deviates from WW
mG,T if Gt unilaterally deviates from WW
In war periods, F t passes on the existing message if WW is observed (or if both individuals
deviate from W ). Otherwise, F t’s message indicates the beginning of a punishment phase
for a deviator.
Next suppose that t ≥ 0 is a peace period. For any realized signal st+1, the message
strategy is described in each of the three phases as follows. First, in the equilibrium phase
we have
µtF(m
∗, st+1, at) =

mF ,T if at = DC or WC
mG,T if at = CD or CW
m∗ otherwise
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In words, an individual who received m∗ sends message mF ,T (resp., mG,T ) to his successor
if a unilateral action deviation by F t (resp., Gt) is observed during a peace period. Next, in
the G-punishment phase,
µtF(m
G,τ , st+1, at) =

mG,τ−1 if at = DC and τ > 1
mG,T if at = DD, DW, CD, or CW
mF ,T if at = WC,
m∗ otherwise
During a G-punishment phase the individual F t who received mG,τ sends message mG,τ−1
to his successor if no action deviation is observed in peace period t. If τ = 1 then the
G-punishment phase is ending, and so he sends m∗. Action deviations simply (re)start a
punishment phase. Finally, in the F -punishment phase, F t’s strategy is symmetric to that
in the G-phase.
µtF(m
F ,τ , st+1, at) =

mF ,τ−1 if at = CD and τ > 1
mF ,T if at = DD,WD,DC, orWC
mG,T if at = CW
m∗ otherwise
Step 2. Construction of beliefs b. Recall that we defined the beginning-of-period belief
btF(m
t
F , s
t) of F t as a conditional probability distribution over the entire history of messages
and actions (the beliefs for Gt have the same domain). As a point of notation, since the beliefs
we construct below will not depend on the signal realization st in any way, we suppress it
in the notation and express the above belief by btF(m
t
F). The only beliefs that matter after
any history are F t’s belief about the message received by Gt given that F t receives message
mtF at the beginning of the period. This marginal distribution over Gt’s received messages is
denoted by b¯tF(m
t
F). Abusing notation, we write b¯
t
F(m
t
F) = m to mean that “F t believes
with probability one that his rival received message m.”
Beginning-of-period beliefs are given by: b¯ti(m
∗) =m∗ in the equilibrium phase; b¯tF(m
G,τ ) =
mG,τ in the G-punishment phase; and b¯tF(mF ,τ ) = m∗ in the F -punishment phase. In other
words, the individual F t believes his rival receives the same message in either the equilibrium
or G-punishment phase. However, in the F -punishment phase, F t believes his rival receives
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m∗ instead of mF ,τ . To understand why this can be the case, we refer the reader to the
Consistency argument below.
Similarly, let b¯tF(m
t
F , a
t) denote the updated belief at the end of the period of F t about
the message his rival received at the beginning of the period, given that F t received message
mtF and observed action profile a
t. If t is peace period, then b¯tF(m
F ,τ , atF , a
t
G) = m
∗ for any
action atF and any action a
t
G = C,W . In all other cases, i.e., for all other pairs (m
t
F , a
t),
b¯tF(m
t
F , a
t) = mtF . If t is war period, then b¯
t
F(m
t
F , a
t) = mtF if m
t
F = m
∗,mG,τ . However, if
mtF = m
F ,τ then b¯tF(m
F ,τ , at) = m∗.
Consistency. Consistency of all these beliefs is established as follows. Recall, first, that
consistency entails that beliefs are obtained in the limit of a sequence of completely mixed
strategies defined by “trembles” on the prescribed strategy profile f . We first describe the
trembles formally and then give an intuitive account of their meaning.
Formally, the trembles are all expressed in terms of a common variable ε to be shrunk
to zero as follows. The trembles at the two different action and message stages remain of
course distinct. The difference between them is identified by the power to which ε is raised
in each case. Whenever the equilibrium prescribes an action different from D, then D is
actually played with probability ε2. Whenever the equilibrium prescribes an action different
from W in period t, W is actually played with probability ε
t+3
t+2 . Whenever the equilibrium
prescribes an action different from C in period t, C is actually played with probability ε
t+3
t+2 .
The probability that any F t (resp Gt) sends any message mF ,τ (resp mG,τ ) when instead m∗
is prescribed by the equilibrium strategies is ε. The probability of all other messages being
sent instead of any other equilibrium ones is ε4.
Intuitively, the most common interpretation, one that we adopt here, is that trembles
occur due to small errors at either the action stage or the message stage. Hence, consider an
individual F t who receives an off-the-equilibrium-path message m, at the beginning of the
period. He must weigh several (infinitesimally unlikely) possibilities. He could have received
m when play is in fact in the equilibrium phase and individual F t−1 mistakenly sent message
m instead of m∗. Alternatively, he could have received m because some previous individual
mistakenly took the wrong action during the equilibrium phase. Given the trembles described
above, if a G-punishment phase message mG,τ is observed, then individual F t’s beliefs is the
limit of a sequence where a message error is of order strictly less than that of an action
error. In the limit, F t therefore believes (with probability one) that message mG,τ correctly
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reveals that play is in the G-punishment phase. However, ifmF ,τ is observed, then F t’s beliefs
is the limit of a sequence where a message error is of order strictly larger than that of an
action error. Specifically, he believes that his predecessor erred in sending mF ,τ and that the
equilibrium phase is, in fact, the true phase.12
A similar reasoning applies to end-of-period beliefs. If at the end of the period and given
his received message, individual F t observes an unexpected action by his rival then in all
circumstances except one, he attributes it to an action error by Gt, rather than a message
error by a predecessor. The one exception is where he observes the unexpected action D
by his rival in any peace period of the F -phase. In that case, and recalling his beginning-
of-period beliefs in that phase, he learns that mF ,τ was not, in fact, a mistaken message as
he had earlier believed. For if mF ,τ was, in fact, a mistake, then F t should have observed
action C played by Gt. Since instead Gt played D, and the trembles we use imply that it is
more likely that action D is an equilibrium response by Gt rather than a further deviation,
he should not believe that his predecessor’s message was wrong.
Notice that in the construction, beliefs are always updated from trembles of different
orders. Certain off-path actions are infinitesimals of lower or higher order than certain mes-
sages, depending on the conditioning event. For this reason, the beliefs of all individuals F t
and Gt are degenerate in the sense that they always assign probability one to a particular
past history of messages and actions, both on and off the equilibrium path. Since the beliefs
are degenerate in this sense while, at the same time, the per period signals have full support,
it is easy to see that the belief system b does not depend on signal realizations in any way.
Step 3. Incentives. From the constructions in Steps 1 and 2, observe that neither beliefs
nor strategies depend on signal realizations (i.e., the evidence) in any way. Hence, in what
follows, we omit the signals from the notation and consider the incentives of an individual
F t. The argument for Gt is completely symmetric.
We examine all incentive constraints supposing that t is a peace period. Once equilib-
rium incentives in peace periods have been established, incentives in war periods can be
easily checked since (a) punishment only occurs during peace periods, and (b) because the
12One can see why such beliefs are plausible. They belong to a population of individuals who have inherent
difficulty in accepting blame/fault/responsibility for their own group’s role in a long standing conflict. It’s a
good deal easier to believe that fault lies with the other group. Clearly, one could envision alternative error
structures for different societies. Each would have different implications for equilibrium actions and payoffs
sustained on path.
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equilibrium prescribes WW during war periods regardless of the message, no end-of-period
learning/updating can take place.
Let V tF(m
t
F) denote the beginning-of-period continuation payoff to individual F t in period
t after receiving message mtF from his predecessor, given his belief and the fact that both
dynasties follow their prescribed action and message strategies thereafter. Similarly, we let
U tF(m) denote the continuation payoff to F t if both he and his rival Gt send the same message
m to their successors. Note that at the end of any peace period an individual who is supposed
to send message m believes with certainty that this rival sends the same message m.
Action incentives. Since t is a peace period, then the construction of (f ,b) in Steps 1 and 2
implies
V tF(m
∗) = (1− δ)piF(CC) + δU tF(m∗),
V tF(m
G,τ ) = (1− δ)piF(DC) + δU tF(mG,τ−1), where mG,0 ≡ m∗
V tF(m
F ,τ ) = V tF(m
∗) = (1− δ)piF(CC) + δU tF(m∗)
Notice that the payoff to individual F t after receiving the message mF ,τ is as it would be
in the equilibrium phase. This is because he believes Gt received m∗ from his predecessor
Gt−1. Remember, however, that in the F -punishment phase his assessment is incorrect. The
actual profile in peace period t is CD rather than CC. The “after-the-fact” learning discussed
at the end of Step 2 occurs for decision makers in peace periods. Hence, the end-of-period
beliefs of F t imply U tF(m∗) = V t+1F (m∗) and U tF(mG,τ ) = V t+1F (mG,τ ) for the equilibrium
and G-punishment phases, respectively. However, in the F -phase, U tF(mF ,τ ) 6= V t+1F (mF ,τ ) =
V t+1F (m
∗). This is because F t learns the truth after observing action profile CD in period t,
but he cannot communicate this to his successor F t+1 who instead interprets F t’s message
as an error.
It is not hard to check that for any τ = 1, . . . , T ,
U tF(m
G,τ ) > U tF(m
∗) > U tF(m
F ,τ ),
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and that U t−1F (m
G,τ ) is increasing in τ while U t−1F (m
F ,τ ) is decreasing in τ .13 Using this string
of inequalities and given that δ is close to one, it is straightforward to check that it is not
in F t’s interest to deviate from the prescribed behavior in each of the phases as follows. If,
in the equilibrium phase, F t deviates by choosing W or D, this initiates the F -punishment
phase, in which he receives (through his successors’ actions) a continuation of U tF(m
F ,T ).
While he may gain in the current period from the deviation, in the next T peace periods,
play switches from CC in the equilibrium phase to CD in the F -punishment phase. If T is
large enough, and if δ is close enough to one, this decline in F ’s long run continuation payoff
outweighs the current one-shot deviation gain.
Next consider the G-punishment phase. Here, if F t deviates by choosing W , this also
initiates the F -punishment phase. If he deviates by choosing C, his rival Gt interprets this
as an equilibrium path action and therefore ignores any message to the contrary. Given this
belief by Gt, the best possible continuation for F t following his choice of C is U tF(m∗). But this
also leaves F t worse off than in the G-punishment phase. Finally, during the F -punishment
phase, individual F t mistakenly believes he is in the equilibrium phase. Hence his action
incentives are exactly as in that phase.
Incentives to Send Message m∗. If he sends his prescribed message m∗ (either because play is
in the equilibrium phase, or because he knows that play is at the end of a punishment phase)
his continuation payoff is U tF(m
∗) which always gives him piF(CC) during peace periods. If,
instead, he sends a message mF ,τ then his payoff will also be U tF(m
∗). This is because his
successors will interpret mF ,τ as a message error. Alternatively, if he sends mG,τ his payoff
gives him piF(DC) in the next peace period, but leaves him with piF(DD) in every peace
period thereafter (we ignore war periods since they always yield piF(WW ) regardless of the
message). The reason is as follows. A message mG,τ leads future individuals in dynasty F to
believe that the G-punishment phase is occurring. This, in turn, leads to a choice of D by a
successor in F in the next peace period, t+N . But at that point, individual Gt+N interprets
his rival’s choice of D as a deviation since Gt+N receives m∗ from his predecessor in G. Hence,
expectations are permanently mismatched, and play in these circumstances locks into DD
13The precise calculations of all for these payoffs are tedious though not hard to carry out given the
war-and-peace cycle. For instance, in any peace period t,
U tF (m
F,τ ) = (1− δN )piF (WW ) + δN (1− δ)piF (CD) + δN+1U t+NF (mF,τ−1).
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in every future peace period. For a high enough δ, F t clearly prefers message m∗ to this
alternative.
Incentives to Send Message mG,τ . By sending his prescribed message, say mG,τ , the con-
tinuation payoff for F t is U tF(mG,τ ). By alternatively sending messages m∗ or mF ,τ ′ for any
τ ′, his payoff will be U tF(m
∗) since these both induce CC in future peace periods. Since
U tF(m
G,τ ) > U tF(m
∗) his best response is clearly to send mG,τ . Finally, by sending a different
G-phase message, say mG,τ ′ with τ ′ 6= τ , individual F t cannot gain. If, for instance, τ ′ < τ ,
then the G-phase ends “too soon” which is bad for F t since he benefits from the profile DC
chosen during the peace periods of the G-phase. If, on the other hand, τ ′ > τ , then this leads
to mismatched expectations between future rivals in F and G, leading eventually to play that
locks into DD in all future peace periods.
Incentives to Send Message mF ,τ . When F t is supposed to send mF ,τ , he correctly infers
that the true phase is F -punishment. However, his options are now limited because his
successor F t+1 interprets message mF ,τ as an error. By sending the prescribed message mF ,τ ,
he then receives piF(CD) for the next τ peace periods, but play will then eventually return
the countries to the equilibrium phase. To verify that he will indeed send mF ,τ if δ is close
enough to one, observe that a deviation to m∗, mF ,τ
′
for τ ′ < τ , or mG,τ
′′
would cause
mismatched expectations, as outlined before, eventually leading to DD in all future peace
periods. Finally, one can show that F t is indifferent between mF ,τ and mF ,τ ′ for τ ′ > τ .
With this we conclude the argument.
4. Social Memory, Messages, and Evidence
The logic of the result highlights the critical roles of private, intra-dynastic messages and the
error structure on those messages and actions. In the next few subsections, we re-examine
these roles in more detail and ask whether and to what extent the particular features of our
equilibrium are essential to sustaining below-minmax payoffs.
4.1. All Out War and Private Communication
Social memory hinges on information transmission through time. How important is the
private communication between one generation of individuals and the next in sustaining
frequent all out wars? Consider the dynastic game with messages taken out entirely. Then,
for every t, the long-run continuation payoffs in (2) cannot be below the minmax payoff for
either F or G. Therefore the all out war equilibrium of Proposition 1 is no longer viable.
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This follows from the fact that, with messages taken out the dynastic game is easily seen
to be equivalent to a repeated game with “imperfect public monitoring” (Fudenberg, Levine,
and Maskin, 1994) in which individuals are forbidden from using “private strategies.”14 Every
“perfect public equilibrium” in Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994) yields long-run payoffs
that cannot be below a player’s minmax payoff. Hence, in our case not below the minmax
payoffs piF(DW ) and piG(WD), respectively.
4.2. Messages Versus Evidence
Proposition 1 is false if the evidence st is perfectly informative about the past history of
action profiles. In this case social memory must be correct. In particular, if we set γ = 1, the
long-run continuation payoffs in (2) cannot be below the minmax for either F or G. Therefore
the all out war equilibrium of Proposition 1 is no longer viable.
To see why this is true we can proceed by induction in the following way. Individuals
F0 and G0 of course observe nothing about past play and do not receive any messages at
all. So, in equilibrium they forecast correctly the action chosen by the opposing individual.15
Then, during period 0, an action pair is played, and finally messages m1F and m
1
G are sent to
individuals F1 and G1.
At the beginning of period 1, individuals F1 and G1 observe m1F and m1G and the action
pair that took place at 0 (since γ = 1). Now we can ask whether the beginning-of-period
beliefs of individual F1 about what message individual G1 has received (and hence about
what he will play) can possibly depend on m1F . The answer must be no. This is because
individual F1 observes exactly what individual G0 observed when he selected the message
m1G he sent to G1. Hence, in equilibrium, individual F1 can forecast exactly the message m1G
simply on the basis of what he observes about the past. Therefore his beginning-of-period
beliefs about m1G do not depend on m
1
F . A symmetric argument can be used to see that the
beginning-of-period beliefs of individual G1 about m1F cannot depend on the message m1G he
receives.
Proceeding by induction forward in time, this line of argument shows that the beginning-
of-period beliefs of any individuals F t and Gt about what the opposing individual is about
14The latter is because individuals F t and Gt observe st at the beginning of t, but do not observe directly
the actions of any previous individuals, not even those of their own predecessors in the same country.
15The argument is more delicate but essentially the same if mixed strategies are allowed. In this case
of course each individual forecasts correctly the probabilities with which each action will be taken by the
opposing individual.
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to choose cannot depend on the messages mtF and m
t
G that they respectively receive.
From the insensitivity of beliefs to messages we have just shown we can then deduce that
when the evidence st is perfectly informative, the model must behave in the same way as the
model with private messages taken out entirely.16 This, as we saw above, implies that the
long-run continuation payoffs in (2) can never be below the minmax for either country.
On the other hand, things change dramatically if γ < 1. We remarked already that the
beliefs of individuals F t and Gt in the equilibrium in Proposition 1 do not depend on the
realization of the observed evidence st. This is neither necessary nor sufficient to gener-
ate “incorrect social memory.” To see what this means formally, start with an individual’s
beginning-of-period belief bti(m
t
i, s
t), and take the appropriate marginal distributions to de-
rive belief qti(m
t
i, s
t) over past histories of actions. Social memory can thus be identified with
belief qti which, intuitively, coincides with the wider notion of social memory discussed earlier
(see, for instance, Crumley (2002)). By this definition, qti could be incorrect even though it
varies with the signal st. Alternatively, qti could be full and correct even though it does not
vary with the signal. This is because the messages from one generation to the next can in
principle convey all available information about the past history of action profiles.17
Intuitively, equilibrium beliefs can be independent of the evidence from the past as in
the equilibrium in Proposition 1 because the messages are sent after individuals F t and Gt
observe the actual play in period t, and hence, in principle, can convey the true record of
play. Physical evidence, on the other hand, cannot possibly contain all information about
what happened in the past. It is then possible that the individuals place sufficiently more
trust in the messages than in the physical evidence and effectively ignore the latter. In a
sense, it is precisely because messages can in principle noiselessly encode the actual history
that they may entirely override the evidence in the equilibrium beliefs. We view this as an
appealing and realistic attribute of the model.
16The argument here becomes a little more involved than our intuitive description suggests. This is because
upon receiving different messages, an individual may take different actions even though his beliefs are the
same. However, this difficulty can be circumvented noting that, since his beliefs are the same, he must be
indifferent between the different actions he takes.
17It is in fact possible to construct “truthful” equilibria in which all information about the past history of
play is correctly conveyed from one set of individuals to the next. The perturbations that must be used to
construct the individuals beliefs in such equilibria are far from “natural.” In essence full truthfulness requires
that a single message mistake be infinitely less likely than an unbounded number of action mistakes combined.
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4.3. Imperfect Current Monitoring
In light of our previous discussion of messages versus evidence, we consider the following
modification of the model. In each period individuals F t and Gt, after choosing their action
at t, no longer observe the opponent’s action at t while they still observe the imperfect public
signal pt of the action pair taken at t, as before. All other details of the model are unchanged.
Refer to this modified model as one of imperfect current monitoring.
Under imperfect current monitoring, physical evidence is the main engine behind equi-
librium behavior. Crucially, this is reflected in the impossibility of social memory that is
systematically wrong. In fact there is a well defined sense in which under imperfect current
monitoring social memory must be effectively correct.
Given any t ≤ t − 1, it will be convenient to denote by qtF(t,mtF , st) and qtG(t,mtG, st)
the probability distributions over action profiles in periods t, . . . , t − 1 only implied by (the
marginals of) qtF(m
t
F , s
t) and qtG(m
t
G, s
t). Let ht+ ∈ H t¯ ×
(
×t¯−1τ=0(M τF ×M τG )
)
. That is, ht+
describes a full history of actions and messages up to and including the action stage of t−1.18
We wish to consider histories that follow ht+, assuming no further deviations after the
action stage of t− 1. Let et(ht+, st) be the actual equilibrium distribution over action profiles
in periods t, . . . , t− 1, following ht+, given the evidence st.
The following result shows in essence that with imperfect current monitoring after any
history, on or off path, the two countries’ social memory can only differ from the actual
equilibrium distribution over action profiles in a payoff irrelevant way.
In the following Proposition, two equilibria are said to be equivalent if they have the same
payoff continuations to each player after every history.
Proposition 2. Correct Social Memory: Fix any precision level γ ∈ [0, 1). Any pure strat-
egy sequential equilibrium (ˆf , bˆ) under imperfect current monitoring is equivalent to an equi-
librium (˜f , b˜) with the following properties: (i) neither the beliefs nor the strategies of any
individual depend on his message received (ii) given any t and any history ht+ as above, for
every t > t and st then qtF(t, s
t) = qtG(t, s
t) = et(ht+, s
t).19
A formal proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix. According to its statement, under
imperfect current monitoring, any equilibrium is equivalent to one in which the social memory
18So far we have used the notation ht to indicate a history of action profiles from 0 to t − 1. We are now
using a subscript “+” to indicate a history of both action and message profiles.
19In light of (i), we drop message m in the arguments of beliefs qtF ,q
t
G .
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of both countries about previous action profiles chosen after t must be correct. Our claim
is surprising in the following sense. Going from the dynastic game we considered before to
the one with imperfect current monitoring we degrade the individuals’ information about the
current action profile. Yet, as a result we find that the equilibrium has the same payoffs
after any history as one in which strategies and beliefs do not vary with messages. Moreover,
the individuals’ assessments of the history of play qualitatively improves in the sense that it
cannot be systematically wrong.
This contrasts with our original model where social memory can fail to predict even
the actions of the individuals who follow their equilibrium strategies. To give an example,
consider the equilibrium described in Proposition 1. Let ht+ be defined as before such that
there is one and only one deviation. At the end of period t¯− 2, individual F t¯−2 sends some
message mG,τ instead of m∗ as prescribed. Suppose that all the players in periods t¯− 1, t¯, . . .
play according to the equilibrium of Proposition 1. According to the equilibrium, the action
profile will eventually lock into DD in future peace periods. However, every player in period
t > t¯ − 1 assigns probability zero to the event that DD has ever been played before t. In
other words, the individuals living after period t¯−1 are systematically wrong about the action
profiles played in the peace periods after t¯− 1.
It is worth explicitly making the following observation about imperfect current monitoring.
Using the same logic as in Section 4.1, one can show the following. Fix any precision level γ ∈
[0, 1) and consider the model with imperfect current monitoring. Consider any pure strategy
equilibrium. Then the long-run payoff to both countries cannot be below the minmax payoff.
Therefore the all out war equilibrium of Proposition 1 is no longer viable. In this sense,
degrading the information that individuals have about actions currently taken makes both
countries better off.
It is legitimate to ask what happens if we allow for a current signal that is imperfect
but with a higher level of precision than those concerning past actions; an intermediate
case between our baseline model of Section 2 and the imperfect current monitoring case
considered in this section. In this case, it is not too hard to show, using examples, that
equilibrium behavior can indeed depend on messages in a non-trivial way that allows for
equilibrium payoffs that are not available in the standard repeated game with infinitely-lived
players. Whether in the limit as δ approaches 1 payoffs below the minmax can be sustained
is an open question at this point.
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5. Relation to the Literature
Earlier, we compared this model to other models of war. Unlike most of the literature, this
paper analyzes conflicts so destructive as to deny participants the usual modicum of self
protection (inherent in the minmax outcome). We examine the role of social memory in
generating these types of conflicts.
As far as we know, ours is the only dynastic game model that deals specifically with
issues of war and social memory. There are other dynastic game models of communication:
Anderlini and Lagunoff (2005), Kobayashi (2007), Lagunoff and Matsui (2004), and AGL.
However, they have a different focus. Their interest is in characterizing the broadest possible
equilibrium set rather than in either war or social memory. Indeed, because physical evidence
is absent from those models, they cannot address the questions we pose here on whether/how
social memory incorporates tangible evidence alongside private messages.20
There are, however, two other papers that bear mentioning because they deal with “mem-
ory” and conflict, albeit in very different settings. Glaeser (2005) models the political economy
of group hatred. In his model, “entrepreneurial” politicians can supply hate-creating stories
as a signal of an out-group’s threat to the rest of the uninformed citizenry. Verifying these
stories is costly, and so a politician’s partially revealing (i.e., mixed) strategy leads the citizens
to put more weight in their beliefs on the truthfulness of these stories. Dess´ı (2008) studies
the role of collective memory when individuals’ investment decisions exhibit spillovers. She
models the problem of an informed principal (the older generation) who selectively informs
two younger agents about the value of a noisy signal of the past. Though her model is not
about war per se, the negative spillovers create conflicts among the young, and therefore
must be endogenously controlled by the principal who chooses to selectively withhold some
information.
The present model differs from these and, in our view, contributes to the literature in
one critical respect. In our case a society’s history has no direct effect on current payoffs. In
game theoretic parlance, there are no payoff types. While an individual’s private information
affects his beliefs about past history, it does not reflect any fundamentals. This distinction
is not inconsequential. For instance, in Glaeser’s model, there must be some states of the
world, arising with positive probability, in which the out-group really is dangerous in order
for citizens to believe this even when the out-group is, in fact, not dangerous. Our results
20One other critical difference is that the results of the prior papers do not apply to the case of two dynasties.
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hold without the presence of payoff types: destructive forces can be unleashed even when
there is no objective danger to the current generation in any state of the world.
This is noteworthy, because even in the larger literature on endogenous “memory” that
deals non-war issues, the signals are either tangible, costly, or both. Clearly, the literature
on herding falls into this category. For this massive literature we refer the reader to surveys
on herding by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998) and Gale (1996), and the work
of Ahn and Suominen (2001), Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004), Jackson and Kalai (1999) and
Moscarini, Ottaviani, and Smith (1998).
Among the intergenerational models more closely aligned to our framework, Bisin and
Verdier (2001) propose a model of intergenerational transmission of cultural traits. They
examine a learning process in which imperfectly altruistic parents choose whether to pass on
certain cultural traits to their kids. A society with heterogeneous traits is shown to emerge
if parental and societal transmission mechanisms are substitutes. Tabellini (2008) studies
a similar mechanism for parental transmission of values in a Prisoner’s Dilemma setting.
Benabou and Tirole (2006) propose a signalling model of economic ideology. They analyze
the relationship between the beliefs about the causes of wealth and poverty and redistributive
policies. In their model, people want to use their private productivity as a signal to motivate
their children to work harder when taxes and redistribution are low. In this political regime,
there are greater incentives to send a signal indicating that economic success depends on effort.
At the same time, when people become convinced that economic success depends on effort,
they vote for a regime of low taxes and redistribution. Because of the complementarities,
there are two equilibria: an optimistic “American” equilibrium with laissez-faire public policy,
and a pessimistic “European” equilibrium with a more extensive welfare state.
We emphasize that, just as in Glaeser (2005)’s and Dess´ı (2008)’s frameworks, individual
memory in these models is derived from tangible or costly signals. The signal need not be
an asset that has value but can, nevertheless, effectively encode an individual’s past behavior
(Johnson, Levine, and Pesendorfer, 2001, Kandori, 1992b). Corbae, Temzelides, and Wright
(2003), Kocherlakota (1998), Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) and Wallace (2001) show how
fiat money, for example, plays this role.
Finally, we note that the present results are roughly consistent with a number of unusual
findings in lab experiments designed to capture intergenerational environments. Chaudhuri,
Schotter, and Sopher (2009) and Schotter and Sopher (2003, 2007) show that word-of-mouth
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learning is a stronger force for perpetuating conventions, good or bad, than simply having
access to the historical record. In related experiments, Duffy and Feltovich (2005) report
that word-of-mouth communication frequently makes things worse than observing history
alone. Obviously, the link between theory and the experiments is imperfect. Nevertheless,
their findings largely accord with our results, provided that subjects are never absolutely
certain that the historical evidence they receive is exact. They also help in understanding
the demonstrable effect that private versus public communication has for sustaining bad
outcomes found by Chaudhuri, Schotter, and Sopher (2009).
6. Conclusion
This paper studies the role of social memory in creating and sustaining conflicts. Social
memory is embodied in a society’s vicarious beliefs about the past. These beliefs are shaped by
both intergenerational communication and the imperfect physical evidence from the past. To
formalize it entails a detailed model of the intergenerational communication within dynastic
societies.
We show that there exist equilibria in a canonical Game of Conflict in which “all out war”
occurs with arbitrarily high frequency. In these equilibria physical evidence is ignored and,
in fact, beliefs of one or both parties can be incorrect after certain events.
Significantly, these equilibria can occur despite the fact that there are no objective states
of the world in which the conflict is desirable from anyone’s point of view. These outcomes
could not be attained in a standard infinitely repeated game. Because messages can, in
principle, convey more information than any imperfectly informative physical evidence, there
are equilibria in which the current generation focuses only on the messages. Ironically, social
memory can be incorrect precisely because it relies on sources that can be more informative
than hard evidence.
A few issues bear mentioning here. The first concerns robustness with respect to the
demographic structure. We initially assumed a “canonical demographic” whereby there is full
replacement within each dynasty ever period. However, using a technique known at least since
Ellison (1994), one can show that our results are fairly robust to the demographic structure.
Specifically, it turns out that any equilibrium of the model with canonical demographics has
a corresponding equilibrium of a model in which replacement within a dynasty can occur at
any time provided that there is a uniform upper bound L on individuals’ lifetimes. The idea is
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to construct L interleaved “copies” of the equilibrium with canonical demographics.21 Here,
the strategies and beliefs of individuals alive in periods 0, L, 2L, 3L and so on, “match”
the strategies of the individuals alive in periods 0, 1, 2, 3 and so on in the model with
full replacement every period. Matching here means that when deciding how to play, the
individuals alive at L will only consider information concerning period 0, individuals alive
at 2L will only consider information concerning periods 0 and L and so on, forward without
bound.22 The same construction is used to match the strategies and beliefs of individuals
alive in periods 1, L + 1, 2L + 1, 3L + 1 and so on with those of the individuals alive in
periods 0, 1, 2, 3 and so on in the model with full replacement every period. It is fairly
straightforward in this generalized model to show that for any equilibrium of the model
with canonical demographics and discount factor δ, the construction outlined here yields an
equilibrium for the L-bounded demographics case for a discount factor of δ
1
L .
Second, we have focused our attention entirely on “bad” equilibria with frequent all out
wars. The implication is that wrong social memory is a bad thing. But there is a flip-side
to this which highlights the possible “good” consequences of wrong social memory. Precisely
because very bad payoffs can be sustained on path, these payoffs can be used as “punishments”
off it. We have examples that show that the cooperative outcome CC can be sustained in
equilibrium for a lower δ in the dynastic game than in the standard repeated game if γ is
low. The construction is not as straightforward as it might look at first sight since one cannot
simply “plug in” — say — the equilibrium of Proposition 1 as a punishment phase of another
equilibrium in which CC is sustained. The reason is that the equilibrium of Proposition 1 is
viable for a high δ in the first place.
Whether cooperation can in general be sustained more easily in the dynastic game is an
open question at this point. The question of how the possibility of inaccurate social memory
might lead to the emergence of better equilibria is clearly both interesting and potentially
important. We leave this issue for future research.
21The same would be true if we considered the case where the L-bounded demographics are stochastic in
the sense that no individual lives more than L periods with probability one. The same technique would also
allow us to use the model with canonical demographics to handle demographics with overlapping generations
of individuals within a dynasty. The details are well beyond the scope of this paper.
22Clearly, in the model with the L-bounded demographics, the messages sent must be constructed so that
the relevant information is passed along (unused) via the intervening individuals.
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Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 2
Let (fˆ , bˆ) be a pure strategy equilibrium under imperfect current monitoring. We establish the Proposition
from the point of view of an individual in dynasty F concerning the actions of individuals in dynasty G. The
flip-side of the argument is, mutatis mutandis, identical hence omitted.
Step 1. We first establish that in the equilibrium (fˆ , bˆ), the beliefs of F t concerning the history of actions
and messages taken by dynasty G do not depend on mtF .
Recall that the per-period signals defining st have full support. That is, for any t, any realized st has
positive probability given any possible true history of action profiles ht.
Given the equilibrium strategies of all individuals, and evidence st we can recurse forward to compute
all equilibrium actions and messages of all individuals up to an including period t − 1 in the obvious way.
Fix st = (p0, . . . , pt−1). We begin with F0 and G0, who of course observe nothing about the past. So
their action strategies determine the equilibrium action profile a0∗. Given p0 and the equilibrium message
strategies we can now compute the equilibrium messages m1∗F and m
1∗
G . Given these messages and p
0 we can
then use the equilibrium action strategies of individuals F1 and G1 to compute the equilibrium action profile
a1∗. Recursing forward in this way, we can compute all equilibrium action and message profiles up to and
including at∗ and mt+1∗ = (mt+1∗F ,m
t+1∗
G ).
For a given any st, for every τ = 0, . . . , t let a(τ, st) = (aF (τ, st), aG(τ, st)) and m(τ, st) = (mF (τ, st),
mG(τ, st)) be the equilibrium action and message profiles aτ∗ and mτ∗ we have just computed, but with the
dependence on st made explicit, so that we can now vary it.
Consider individual F t at the beginning of t. The first case we consider is that he observes evidence
st and receives the corresponding equilibrium message mF (t, st). It then follows from completely standard
arguments that his beliefs about the entire history of action and message profiles must assign probability
one to the sequences {a(τ, st)}t−1τ=0 and {m(τ, st)}tτ=1. At the end of period t, since we are in the imperfect
current monitoring case, it must also be the case that F t assigns probability one to individual Gt having
played aG(t, st) and having sent mG(t+ 1, st) to his successor Gt+1.
Now consider again individual F t at the beginning of t, but consider the complementary case in which
he observes evidence st and receives an off-path message mtF 6= mF (t, st). Clearly, in this case he must
conclude that some deviation from equilibrium has occurred. In fact, since we are in the imperfect current
monitoring case, it must be that one or more individuals in dynasty F has deviated before t. Any message
mtF 6= mF (t, st) could not possibly be observed otherwise.
Can the beginning-of-period equilibrium beliefs of F t assign positive probability to one or more individuals
in dynasty G having deviated before t? The answer must be “no.” A routine check reveals that in this case,
since the per-period signals have full support, F t must assign probability zero to this event after observing
st and mtF 6= mF (t, st). Intuitively this is because a deviation by dynasty F is necessary to reach this
“information set,” and it is also the case that a single deviation (for instance at the message stage of t− 1) is
sufficient to reach it. So, ascribing a deviation to dynasty G after observing st and mtF 6= mF (t, st) involves
more deviations than the minimum necessary to actually reach the given information set. By standard
arguments, this can never be the case in a Sequential Equilibrium. Hence, at the beginning of period t the
Anderlini, Gerardi and Lagunoff 31
beliefs of F t about dynasty G must be as in the first case, in which F t observes st and the equilibrium mtF
= m(t, st). At the end of period t, since we are in the imperfect current monitoring case, it must also be the
case that F t assigns probability one to individual Gt having played aG(t, st) and having sent mG(t+1, st) to
his successor Gt+1.
Comparing the first and second case we just considered, it is apparent that the beliefs of F t on path
concerning the history of actions and messages taken by dynasty G do not depend on mtF .
Step 2. In this Step, we construct a new equilibrium (f˜ , b˜) from the original one, and then argue that (a) it
is equivalent to the original equilibrium in the sense that it delivers the same beginning and end of period
payoffs after every history of play; and (b) in this new equilibrium, neither the message or action strategies
nor the beliefs of any individual depend on the message he receives.
To get f˜ from fˆ we set the behavior of all individuals after any off-path message to be the same as if they
had instead observed the equilibrium message. As a consequence, under f˜ the behavior of all individuals (at
the action and the message stage) does not depend on the message they receive.
To get b˜ from bˆ we set the beliefs of all individuals after any off-path message to be the same as if they
had instead observed the equilibrium message. As a consequence, under b˜ the beliefs of all individuals do
not depend on the message they receive.
Clearly, by construction of (f˜ , b˜), neither the message or action strategies nor the beliefs of any individual
depend on the message he receives.
It remains to argue that (f˜ , b˜) is in fact an equilibrium and that it is equivalent to (fˆ , bˆ) in the sense
of (a) above. It is convenient to argue the latter first. As before, we focus on dynasty F . The details for
dynasty G are symmetric.
Given the argument in Step 1, it must be that going from (fˆ , bˆ) to (f˜ , b˜) the beliefs of any individual F t
about the history of actions and messages for dynasty G are the same in the two equilibria.
Since following the receipt of an on-path message the strategies are the same across the two equilibria,
there is clearly nothing to prove in this case.
Consider then an on-path and an off-path message for the same st in the original equilibrium (fˆ , bˆ). That
is consider F t and two information sets, an on-path one given by st and mtF = mF (t, st), and the other
given by the same st and any off-path message mtF 6= mF (t, st). At these two information sets, and at all
the ones following them after st+1 is realized, the beliefs of F t about dynasty G must also be the same. But
this implies that the continuation expected payoff of F t must be the same at these two information sets and
at those following them after st+1 is realized. Because of the way we constructed (f˜ , b˜) from (fˆ , bˆ), this is
clearly enough to show that the two equilibria are equivalent.
To see that (f˜ , b˜) is in fact an equilibrium, we need to verify two things. The first is that the strategies
specified by f˜ are sequentially rational given b˜, and the second is that the beliefs b˜ are admissible for a
Sequential Equilibrium. Sequential rationality is a simple consequence of the fact that (fˆ , bˆ) is an equilibrium
and of how we constructed (f˜ , b˜) from it. If sequential rationality failed at any information set in (f˜ , b˜),
then it would have to fail (on path) at a corresponding information set in (fˆ , bˆ). Lastly, to check that the
beliefs b˜ have the requisite properties is a routine exercise. It is enough to assume that message deviations
are sufficiently “more likely” than deviations at the action stage. We omit the details.
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Step 3. The last step establishes part (ii). Given the equilibrium (f˜ , b˜), the beginning of period equilibrium
beliefs of all individuals can be characterized as follows.
Consider individual F t at the beginning of period t, observing st = (p0, p1, . . . , pt−1). Since the actions of
all individuals do not depend on messages, and the per-period signals have full support, his beliefs about the
previous action profiles chosen can be computed recursively as follows. In period 0 of course no one observes
anything and so the action profile is directly given by the equilibrium action strategies of individuals F0 and
G0. In period 1, we can compute the equilibrium action strategies of F1 and G1, as a function of s1 = p0, and
so on forward in time. In other words, the beginning of period beliefs of any individual F t or Gt, given st
= (p0, p1, . . . , pt−1) can be written as period-by-period functions of the per-period signals pτ with τ = 0, . . . ,
pt−1. So, we can write the social memory of country F at t, as qtF (st) = (q(0, st), q(1, st), . . . , q(t − 1, st)),
where each q(τ, st) (with τ = 0, . . . , t − 1) denotes the action profile in period τ . Note that the function q
does not have a country subscript or superscript since it is the same for F and G. Hence qtG(st) ≡ qtF (st).
Now fix any t, ht+, t > t and s
t. Let e(ht+, s
t) be as in the statement of the Proposition.
By construction, in the equilibrium (f˜ , b˜) the actions of all individuals depend only on the evidence they
observe. Hence, conditional on a given st, given that the per-period signals have full support, both individuals
at time t will behave as if they were in equilibrium, even if the initial history ht is in fact off-path.
It then follows immediately that we can write e(ht+, s
t) as period-by-period functions of the per-period
signals pτ with τ = 0, . . . , pt−1. So, we can write this as et(ht+, s
t) = (e(t, st), . . . , e(t − 1, st)), where each
e(τ, st) (with τ = t, . . . , t− 1) denotes the action profile in period τ .
Since both the functions eτ (·, ·) and qτ (·, ·) are derived directly from the equilibrium strategies, they must
be the same. Hence the claim follows immediately.
